WMATA ROCC. Image from WMATA.

Employees in Metro’s Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) are repeatedly ignoring and bypassing safety procedures - still - which were put in place to protect employees working around the rail system’s power network, according to the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC). The safety commission says the rule violations are occurring even though the new procedures were implemented specifically because employees were ignoring and bypassing the older less-stringent ones.

The WMSC order issued May 17, 2022 highlights the commission’s frustration with the ROCC, which governs movement of trains along the system’s tracks and is charged with protecting employees that work on the tracks themselves. The order references several prior orders, also issued by the WMSC due to safety violations that repeatedly occurred in the ROCC, but notes that controllers are still restoring third rail power to the tracks without following protocol.

Metro said it would implement new safety standards at the ROCC

Metro has had repeated issues with employees not following procedures and management personnel instructing employees to bypass protocol, in the ROCC facility. WMSC audits and orders in the past note that management, including former Senior Vice President Lisa Woodruff, and former ROCC Director Deltrin Harris, themselves violated or instructed controllers to violate safety procedures. Woodruff was later reassigned to a position within the Chief Operating Officer’s office. Harris left Metro to become General Manager of Rail Operations and Facilities at Charlotte Area Transportation System (CATS).

Metro General Manager Paul Wiedefeld committed to overhauling the ROCC in 2020, and appointed Jayme Johnson (now Vice President and Assistant Chief Safety Officer) to lead the organizational change needed. One of the many changes included in the overhaul were changes to how controllers restore power to the tracks and ensuring it’s done properly.

Improper track power restoration has the “potential to cause serious injury or death,” according to the WMSC.

Metro set about attempting to reform the ROCC through a number of programs, including creation of the Power Desk. Image from WMATA.

“Metrorail’s culture of noncompliance”

As an added safety precaution to address WMSC requirements, Metro implemented a “power desk” with employees responsible solely for the safe restoration of power to the tracks. Workers at the desk are supposed to independently confirm with ROCC rail controllers in charge of specific areas of the system that it’s safe to restore power, and also the actual workers on the track. Once the power desk controller performs that independent verification, the Power Desk Assistant Superintendent is supposed to make sure that the power desk controller did what they were supposed to, and then allow them to restore power upon verification.

But the WMSC says that’s not happening. “The investigation…provides further evidence that elements of Metrorail have a culture that accepts noncompliance with written operational rules, instructions, and manuals,” their order states.

As part of the ROCC overhaul, Metro set up a “local safety committee” to meet monthly to raise and address safety concerns. Image from WMATA.

While investigating several safety incidents since the new power procedures were implemented, the commission says that “Power Desk personnel, including supervision and management, did not follow the specific safety procedures that management specifically designed to assure safety.” The WMSC says they provided feedback to Metro to strengthen the new protocols put in place and that Metrorail gave them “repeated assurances” that the new procedures would provide “redundant protections against improper power restoration.”

Among the safety failures, the WMSC says that Power Desk controllers and management regularly use personal notes, rather than Metro’s digital track rights management (GOTRS) application, in part because “personnel believe this circumvention of safety requirements results in a quicker process” - which the WMSC notes is “expressly contrary” to the purpose of the rules.

One of the commission’s findings says the procedures Metro put in place aren’t foolproof, and can be circumvented. Nothing prevents power desk controllers from restoring power prior to completing the checklist in GOTRS, for instance, which the WMSC found during their investigations. Power desk personnel were routinely restoring power to work areas before completing the necessary steps in GOTRS - the opposite order that it’s supposed to be done in.

In one incident, a power desk controller restored power to a section of track at 4:20am, but they and the rail controller didn’t verify that employees were off the roadway until 4:37am, 17 minutes later. The WMSC did not report that there were any injuries.

The WMSC orders Metro, again, to beef up its ROCC safety protocols

The latest WMSC order to Metro takes further steps requiring the agency to put resilient safeguards in place around power restoration.

To address what the WMSC considers unsafe use of overtime and related fatigue, Metro cannot have more than 30 work locations overnight at a time, or 10 per each of the three power desks. The safety commission determined that due to inadequate staffing and too many work zones per power desk controller, that “many shifts are being covered by overtime,” and in some cases are making up the vast majority of the power desk’s shifts.

The work limitation comes in response to controllers reporting having been “flustered” due to the “high and challenging workload.” During mid April, power controllers were attempting to handle 17 locations on average per night.

On the technical side, the commission is now requiring Metro to come up with technical solutions to make sure that power isn’t turned back on before it’s safe. They want Metro to upgrade its train management system (AIM) so controllers and management can’t just bypass safety protocols, but are forced to comply.

Last but certainly not least, the WMSC sent Metro’s Safety Certification Review Committee, who approved the power desk’s initial implementation plan, back to the drawing board to come up with a new Safety Certification Verification Report (SSCVR) justifying that the way the power desk is set up is safe. The Review Committee previously voted in mid-April, 2022 and approved the power desk certification.

This time around, the WMSC laid out specific actions they want to see in the report, including an “updated operation hazard analysis” which would be “based on the actual hazards demonstrated in the implementation of the Power Desk.” The prior attempt that Metro said would address the WMSC’s concerns didn’t, according to the WMSC, and Metro’s statements that they did are “not accurate.”

Metro now has 30 days to address the WMSC order and respond with plans that sufficiently satisfy the safety commission.

Stephen Repetski is a Virginia native and has lived in the Fairfax area for over 20 years. He has a BS in Applied Networking and Systems Administration from Rochester Institute of Technology and works in Information Technology. Learning about, discussing, and analyzing transit (especially planes and trains) is a hobby he enjoys.