Gallery Place in DC by Elvert Barnes licensed under Creative Commons.

In response to major, ongoing issues in Metro’s rail control center, the agency’s oversight committee is requiring solutions to problems that “pose unacceptable risks for Metrorail customers, employees, and contractors” if left unaddressed.

The new Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC) directive comes six months after their last which found “yelling, conflicting instructions,” and “dysfunction” in the control center and echos of issues the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) found after the deadly 2015 L’Enfant smoke incident.

Management and procedural issues inside Metro’s Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) are not new. The WMSC is the third oversight body to bring them to light after the Tri-State Oversight Commission and the Federal Transit Administration.

The latest findings from the WMSC focus on three “serious safety issues” that affect how the control center responds to emergencies, manages trains, and keeps workers and emergency personnel safe while they’re on the tracks.

Controllers say training is inadequate

The WMSC was able to conduct interviews with 21 of the 26 Rail Traffic Controllers that work in the ROCC. In them, “nearly all controllers interviewed said their training on the use of emergency ventilation fans was inadequate.” Ventilation fans throughout the Metrorail system can be used in emergencies to clear smoke from stations or sections of tunnel.

The NTSB cited inadequate training and lack of written procedures for operating ventilation fans as contributing factors to the deadly 2015 smoke incident in which a Yellow Line train became trapped outside the L’Enfant Plaza station, “dozens” went to the hospital with smoke inhalation, and one passenger died.

An Emergency Ventilation Playbook which Metro developed after the L’Enfant incident to satisfy the NTSB has apparently gone unused, according to the WMSC. “Many controllers had not seen the document,” the report states, even though the ROCC director said it is “available in hard copy at the controllers’ desks.” In addition, rail controllers say “there was no significant fan training in their regular recertification classes” to ensure they still know how to operate them.

The safety commission warns the lack of training could be deadly if another incident were to occur: “This lack of readiness to respond to smoke and fire events could lead to a repeat of the January 12, 2015, L’Enfant Plaza station electrical arcing and smoke accident, or worse.”

Rail management interference causes confusion

Three pairs of controllers typically run the Metrorail system during any one eight-hour shift. One controller works the radio talking with train operators and personnel while the other works the computer console setting switches controlling train movement in their section of the system.

The WMSC says controllers develop a “mental model” of where trains and personnel are in order to understand where and when trains need to go. Safe rail operations, the WMSC says, requires that controllers use their knowledge of the computer console settings as well as their mental model to build a “movement plan” to keep trains moving.

Rail controllers told the WMSC that others in the control center were able to change their computer console settings, and were doing so frequently and without notice. The director of the ROCC suggested the controllers were responsible for looking out for changes made unknowingly by someone else; “they can see what they did not do.”

The WMSC report states multiple people making changes to the same set of signals can and has led to unsafe conditions. In one instance, “a work zone indication was removed from a controller’s screen, despite crews remaining on the tracks.” The Commission found that remote management “could lead to a collision, derailment or jeopardize the safety of front line personnel.”

ROCC management tells controllers to disregard safety precautions

“Almost all controllers” told the WMSC that management routinely rushed them when turning power back on to the tracks instead of prioritizing safety. Metro uses a 750-volt direct current third-rail power system to run its trains, which could cause grave harm or worse if a person were to make contact. Metro employees have been sent to the hospital before when touching energized third rail.

When investigating a December 10, 2019 fire incident on the Red Line, the WMSC found that the ROCC Director instructed third rail power be turned back on while emergency personnel were still on the tracks in violation of Metro procedures, The Fire Department liaison, stationed in the ROCC, was able to warn the emergency responders and none were hurt.

The WMSC now wants Metro to develop new procedures for turning power back on which requires at least two people to independently confirm that it’s safe to do so. Metro made some progress already on this after the December incident, but progress on the software change has stalled due to the ongoing coronavirus situation.

ROCC management haven’t learned from past mistakes

While the WMSC report is new, many of the issues cited inside it are not. Management have “clearly disregarded many lessons of the past,” it reads, and they have “failed to improve Metrorail’s preparedness.”

Checklists, as one example, are still not always being followed. “In prior conversations, control center management has attempted to explain…that standard operating procedures and checklists are not practicable in an emergency.” During the December 10 fire incident, “managers removed a controller from duty who was properly using procedures and checklists,” which the WMSC says exacerbated the situation.

The issue with checklists include the ROCC Director and other ROCC leaders who “continue to direct controllers to violate safety rules or procedures.” The WMSC points to an example where the ROCC Director instructed a controller to allow a train to operate past a red signal without verifying the switches on the tracks were secured as required by Metro protocols. In another instance, the ROCC Director had a train operator move a disabled train without verifying all the doors were closed or if passengers were still onboard.

“Despite our prior direction, direction from the NTSB, and findings from the FTA over the last five years,” states the report, “on May 10, 2020, the ROCC Director told the WMSC that management was still considering whether to allow the use of checklists in some circumstances.”

Staffing levels in the ROCC even worse than before

The ROCC is the metaphorical nerve center of the Metrorail system, similar to an Air Traffic Control tower. The controllers are the definitive authority over who can go where and when on the rail system, but are also in short supply. “…if even a few people who work in proximity need to quarantine, Metro is vulnerable to shift-length closures,” said Metro General Manager Paul Wiedefeld in a recent op-ed.

The WMSC report states 26 controllers, split across three eight-hour shifts, are employed in the ROCC and run the rail system 24x7. The shrinking number of rail controllers has been an issue for years, highlighted by Metro itself in a quality assurance and oversight report from 2017 and by the FTA in 2015. Metro had 39 controllers on payroll in 2017, out of 44 total positions, and 34 out of 52 positions in 2015.

ROCC understaffing is a multi-pronged issue and appears to be continuing unabated. With so few controllers, losing any to a coronavirus infection could be devastating if others also have to isolate. It also means controllers aren’t able to receive as much training because they’re needed at their desks so they have less of a chance to improve their skills.

The workload, increased because of the lack of Automatic Train Operation, contributes as well to the stress of the job and reportedly increases to job turnover. But with so few controllers, they’re more valuable to the agency who is loath to let any go through attrition or severance.

A small group of people with such great power puts Metro in a precarious position, and the calculus to fixing the ROCC is complex. The agency needs to simultaneously:

  • Grow the ranks of controllers by hiring new controllers and getting them up to speed
  • Prepare them to work in a department with such lengthily-documented issues
  • Reform the management group so they consistently abide by policies and run an effective department
  • While continuing to run trains during the day and manage trackwork at night
  • And trying to lose as few employees as possible

Greater Greater Washington reached about to WMATA for comment. Sherri Ly, a spokesperson for WMATA, replied:

Metro’s chief safety officer welcomed the report and will continue to work with WMSC toward a shared goal of building the safest railroad operation possible. There are a number of efforts underway to address findings. Specifically, Metro is working to implement a technology solution to reduce the potential for human error in re-energizing third-rail power. In the interim, existing administrative procedures for energizing power are being reissued, employees are being reinstructed on the processes and management oversight of compliance will be tightened. Additional assessments of compliance with these safety protocols will be conducted by Metro staff outside of the chain of command in the ROCC. Similarly, with respect to fan operations, additional materials are being developed to assist controllers in the event of an incident where the use of fans is necessary.

Management is reviewing the interaction of supervisors and controllers to assure roles and communications are clear at all times, while noting there is an essential role for strong supervision within the control center environment. The chief safety officer hopes to obtain additional information from WMSC regarding their findings based on controller accounts to further improve our safety posture. Finally, with regard to the supervisor-controller interaction, it is important for the public to understand that Metro’s signal system has vital logic that prevents ROCC personnel – controllers or supervisors – from establishing conflicting or unsafe routes for trains.

While reforming the ROCC is still doable, the path to do so is certainly challenging.

This article has been updated with a comment from WMATA spokesperson Sherri Ly.

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Tagged: metrorail, transit, wmata

Stephen Repetski is a Virginia native and has lived in the Fairfax area for over 20 years. He has a BS in Applied Networking and Systems Administration from Rochester Institute of Technology and works in Information Technology. Learning about, discussing, and analyzing transit (especially planes and trains) is a hobby he enjoys.