Train operators continue running red signals on Metro, say the feds

Metro trains have run red lights 68 times in the last four and a half years, according to the Federal Transit Administration (FTA). The number of incidents per year isn’t going down, and while different types of human error have been the immediate causes, poor training and culture are underlying factors.

Stop signal violations occur any time a train operator passes a red signal, or when they pass an employee on the roadway who’s telling the train not to move any farther. To run a stop signal is to break a cardinal rule of Metro, putting people on and near the train in serious danger; doing so is a fireable offense.

The FTA initiated its investigation into stop signal overruns at Metro after the number of violations kept increasing in 2015. The investigation focused on figuring out how often signal violations occur, identifying potential consequences, determining the contributing factors leading up to the violations, and assessing what Metro is doing to prevent additional overruns in the future.

Four times since 2012, two trains have come closer than 500 feet to each other, most recently in February when two trains ended up facing each other just 150 feet away. In addition, three times since the FTA assumed oversight of Metro began have trains come “within seconds” of striking another passenger train or workers on the roadway.

Number of recorded stop signal overruns per year since 2012. #wmata pic.twitter.com/bhrUQk4xqf

— Metro Reasons (@MetroReasons) August 16, 2016

Here are the FTA’s conclusions about why Metro is running stop signs

According to the FTA’s investigation, the first reason train operators run stop signals is that they aren’t familiar enough with the track territory where they operate, meaning they don’t know where the signals are. The FTA claims this played a role in 30 percent of stop signal overruns, and in 12 incidents where the operator had less than one year of experience driving the train/work vehicle.

A lack of familiarity with the rail system is pretty self-explanatory: operators may not have received comprehensive-enough training to make sure they know where all signals are, including the non-standard signals that appear on the left of the train instead of the right. Especially when 12 of these incidents occurred with a new-near train operator, it makes sense that a lack of training or not enough training is a possible culprit.

Second, due to inattention or confusion, train operators leave stations or terminals without the authority to do so, which contributes to 34 percent of the 68 overruns studied. The FTA found “inattentiveness, lack of preparation, and failing to follow established procedure” was one of the leading cause of overruns.

Third, “poor or incomplete communication” between train operators and the Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) contributed to 36 percent of overruns. Radios were difficult to hear due to volume or distortion issues, transmitted communication didn’t follow the proper protocols, and/or repeat-backs in which the operator is required to repeat back the ROCC controller’s instructions word-for-word didn’t happen properly.

In addition to these categories, the FTA also noted that Metro hasn’t typically kept enough records in the past to be able to truly dive into and find the root causes of overruns in order to put a stop to them.

“WMATA does not currently collect a sufficiently broad or consistent set of data to enable the agency to identify trends and create targeted mitigations,” the report says.

While the FTA broke down the overruns into these and a few more categories, they noted that there wasn’t much data showing that overruns happened at particular signals, or at times of day. The 68 overruns happened both during the day and at night fairly regularly throughout the entire year, both on the main two tracks of the system as well as in pocket tracks, at terminal stations, and in yards.

Both novice and veteran train operators were liable to overrun stations, although the new operators were more likely to. “There are few clearly discernible patterns or trends regarding the occurrence of these incidents on the Metrorail system,” concluded the FTA.

What Metro is doing to try and prevent more overruns

The report notes that Metro switched fully to manual operator-driven trains in 2009 after the Fort Totten crash, which was caused in part due to parasitic oscillation (by which a spurious electrical signal can in essence cause the train control system to “lose” track of a train). Since then, Metro has primarily attempt to prevent overruns through additional compliance with operating rules, through things like adding additional signage.

Additional rules were added or modified to clarify where and when trains can move (i.e. no closer than 10 feet to a red signal at an interlocking, unless otherwise instructed), who to contact in order to gain permission to move the train, adding signs to notify operators when signals are on the left instead of the right, and checklists on every train console to help remind operators what they need to do before moving a train.

Yet other signs were added to center pocket tracks to remind train operators that they have to be in manual mode (instead of automatic) at those locations, and the FTA also notes Metro has performed safety stand-downs to discuss the causes of overruns and potential mitigations. Some of these steps have been taken around the system to mitigate overruns, and yet they keep happening at nearly the same rate as they have for the past four years.

While all of this seems to be fairly disheartening and may just be one more reason that some people stop riding the system, the FTA does say that Metro is taking steps in the right direction.

Since the FTA started its oversight, Metro has “made considerable progress” in addressing findings from both the reports that the FTA has previously issued and Metro’s internal reports. The agency has started to revise standard operating procedures, expand training and supervision for train operators and ROCC controllers, in addition to making sure radio discipline is better, and more.

Pat Lavin, Metro’s new Chief Safety Officer, seems poised to continue this increased scrutiny of Metro operations. With proper leadership to make Metro’s safety department proactive, performing their own investigations and root cause analysis, the agency has the opportunity to dig into problems and fix them before need a federal agency to investigate on their behalf. Being able to find, target, and resolve issues before they become large issues is a goal that Metro can strive for and achieve, given the proper effort.

But the topic of Automatic Train Operation (ATO), which helps the train operator out by automating the “boring” automatable parts of driving in between stations, barely gets a mention. The FTA’s report now says that Metro might be ready to re-enable ATO, “in 2017 or 2018,” but that should be done sooner.

ATO isn’t necessarily just a nice technology to help make trains brake/accelerate smoother, but it can also be a robust safety mechanism to help prevent these stop signal overruns.