These are the problems the feds say WMATA needs to fix

In December, the Federal Transit Administration gave WMATA a list of 217 issues it needs to fix in order to be a truly safe system. A month and a half later, the agency is on the right track, but it will take years to prove that it has a healthy safety culture day in and day out.

Examples of issues the FTA highlighted include a number of trains that ran red “stop” signals and train operators saying they consistently felt pressure to stay on-time when running trains. WMATA’s interim chief safety officer Lou Brown said that the agency is “very serious” and “very dedicated” to improving the system’s safety, which would mean mitigating or resolving the issues the FTA noted.

The full list, which is lengthy, stems from the FTA’s large inspection of WMATA early in 2015, some NTSB recommendations for WMATA that are still open, and the Tri-State Oversight Committee (TOC). In fact, most come from the TOC, but that agency did not have powers to actually make WMATA do anything; as many of them are still legitimate issues, the FTA combined them in with their findings.

Until a new agency is set up to take over for the TOC the FTA will be in charge of overseeing WMATA.

I’ve summarized some of the more interesting findings and explained why they are worth caring about below:

• The group responsible for supporting the Automatic Train Control (ATC) system that keeps trains safely separated is keeping track of inventory it no longer uses but not whether tools are properly calibrated.
• Sheets that Metro track inspectors use when looking at interlockings (that’s where two sets of track converge) have checkboxes already filled in before the inspector has even checked the track.
• The agency is not following it’s own safety and security certification process as required. Metro’s safety office has been criticized by the Board of Directors for not being very involved in enforcing safety procedures.
• Metro allowed personnel without proper qualifications to operate rail equipment. In the case of one accident, the work unit operator had been involved in a previous accident and shouldn’t have been in charge.
• At several locations, hazardous materials that could react if the came into contact with each other were not stored separately.
• There is no formal procedure for testing and replacing emergency equipment used in real emergencies or practice drills.
• The communications group in charge of maintaining Metro’s radio systems is required to do more maintenance work than they have time for, and many communications technicians haven’t received classroom training on how to use the current digital radio system.
• Between Jan 1, 2012 and Nov 2, 2015, train operators ran past 47 red signals. There were more signal overruns in 2015 than in either of the two prior years.
• Metro is still running 1000-series rail cars; the NTSB has told them to replace the 1000-series rail cars with safer equipment.
• The Rail Operations Control Center where trains are dispatched and routed is noisy and distracting, and the computer system doesn’t have enough checks to prevent potential human errors.
• The Metro radio system still works poorly in some areas (although others have improved). Train operators, police, and emergency responders can’t communicate with each other when the radio system doesn’t work.
• The safety department doesn’t always review passenger complains that train intercoms don’t work. The intercoms, located at either end of each car, allow Metro riders to call the train operator in order communicate with them in an emergency.